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TOO EARLY OR TOO LATE: U.S. SUPREME 
COURT SHOULD RULE CONSTRUCTIVE 
DISCHARGE CLAIMS ACCRUE  
UPON RESIGNATION 
Abstract: The U.S. Courts of Appeals are divided regarding when an employee’s 
Title VII constructive discharge claim begins to accrue. The First, Second, Fourth, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held that the claim begins to accrue when the em-
ployee resigns. The Seventh, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have held 
that constructive discharge claims begin to accrue at the time of the employer’s last 
discriminatory act. In April 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Green v. Donahoe, a 2014 Tenth Circuit decision that deepened the circuit split. 
This Note argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should resolve this circuit split by 
overturning the Tenth Circuit’s 2014 decision in Green v. Donahoe because accrual 
upon resignation is more administratively efficient, intuitive for employees, and 
consistent with Title VII’s purpose. 
INTRODUCTION 
Marvin Green worked for the U.S. Postal Service for thirty-five years, 
starting as a letter carrier and working his way up to postmaster for Eng-
lewood, Colorado.1 In 2008, Green applied for an open postmaster position in 
Boulder, Colorado, but was denied the promotion.2 Green believed the Postal 
Service discriminated against him for being black because the person hired for 
the position had less experience and did not even submit an application.3 
Green filed a formal charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) 
Office regarding his denied promotion.4 Subsequently, Green believed the 
Postal Service retaliated against him for making the discrimination complaint 
and filed two informal charges alleging retaliation.5 
On December 11, 2009, the Postal Service held an investigative interview 
in which Green was accused of several transgressions, the most serious of 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Green v. Donahoe (Green II), 760 F.3d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. 
Green v. Brennan, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (Apr. 27, 2015); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Green II, 760 
F.3d 1135 (No. 14-613), 2014 WL 6706152, at *6. 
 2 Green II, 760 F.3d at 1137; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 6 (noting Green was 
passed over for promotion despite his unblemished record). 
 3 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 6. 
 4 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1137. 
 5 See id. (stating Green twice contacted EEO counselors about retaliation while his original denial 
of promotion complaint went through applicable administrative channels). 
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which was “intentionally delaying the mail,” a criminal offense.6 Green was 
put on “emergency-placement,” a type of probationary administrative leave, 
and his pay was suspended.7 Unbeknownst to Green, immediately after the 
interview on December 11, the investigative agents concluded that Green did 
not intentionally delay the mail.8 The Postal Service’s human resources man-
ager warned Green’s union representative that the criminal charge could be a 
“life changer” and the two worked on negotiating an agreement.9 
The parties eventually reached an agreement, which was signed on De-
cember 16, 2009.10 The agreement ended Green’s emergency placement and 
allowed him to use his accumulated paid leave to cover his salary through 
March 2010.11 The agreement also removed Green from his current position, 
demoted him to a position in Wyoming that was almost three hundred miles 
away, and cut his salary by about $40,000 per year.12 Per the agreement, Green 
could either report to his new position in Wyoming on April 1 or retire by 
March 31, 2010.13 
Green submitted his resignation on February 9, effective on March 31, 
2010.14 On March 22, forty-one days after submitting his resignation, Green 
contacted an EEO counselor and alleged that he was constructively discharged 
in retaliation for a protected Title VII activity.15 In 2013, in Green v. Donahoe, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Green’s construc-
tive discharge claim for being untimely.16 The court held that Green’s construc-
tive discharge claim began to accrue when he signed the agreement and he did 
not properly act within the forty-five day limitations period set for federal em-
                                                                                                                           
 6 See id. at 1137–38; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012) (describing the obstruction of mails gener-
ally). 
 7 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1138; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that 
Green’s supervisors put him on emergency-placement for alleged “disruption of day-to-day postal 
operations”). 
 8 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1138; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 7–8 (stating that 
Green went on administrative leave under the impression he might be subject to criminal prosecution). 
 9 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1138; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 8 (noting that the 
Postal Service’s warning about criminal prosecution occurred one day after investigative agents con-
cluded Green did not intentionally delay the mail). 
 10 Green II, 760 F.3d at 1138 (stating deal occurred after negotiations between Green’s union 
representative and Postal Service human resources manager). 
 11 Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 8. 
 12 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1138; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 8. 
 13 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1138; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 8. 
 14 Green II, 760 F.3d at 1138. Prior to giving his resignation notice, Green met with an EEO 
counselor on January 7, 2010, and filed an informal retaliation charge based on the December 11, 
2009, investigative interview. See id. Green filed a formal charge on February 17, 2010, but the EEO 
Office dismissed the claim because Green had signed the settlement agreement on December 16, 
2009. See id. 
 15 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1138; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 9. 
 16 See Green v. Donahoe (Green I), No. 10-CV-02201-LTB-KMT, 2013 WL 424777, at *5–6 (D. 
Colo. Feb. 4, 2013). 
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ployees.17 In 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision.18 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals are divided regarding when an employee’s Title 
VII constructive discharge claim begins to accrue.19 Federal regulations set out 
various restrictions regarding the timing of notice and filing requirements for 
alleged Title VII violations.20 The circuits disagree, however, on when the clock 
starts running in constructive discharge claims.21 The Seventh, Tenth, and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits have held that a claim begins to accrue against the 
filing window when the adverse employment action occurs.22 In contrast, the 
First, Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held that Title VII con-
structive discharge claims begin to accrue when the employee resigns.23 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103(b)(3) (2014) (applying Part 1614 of C.F.R. to U.S. Post-
al Service employees complaining of employment discrimination); id. § 1614.105 (requiring postal 
service employees who believe they have been illegally discriminated against to initiate contact with 
EEO counselor within forty-five days of the date of the alleged discriminatory matter). 
 18 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1147. 
 19 Compare id. at 1143–45 (holding claim began to accrue at time of employer’s last discrimina-
tory act), Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & Safety Fund of N. Am., 478 F.3d 364, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(ruling employee failed to identify a single act of discrimination within statutory period because con-
structive discharge itself was not sufficient), and Davidson v. Ind.-Am. Water Works, 953 F.2d 1058, 
1059–60 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding claim time-barred because last alleged discriminatory act did not 
include employee’s resignation), with Flaherty v. Metromail Corp., 235 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(ruling constructive discharge claim began to accrue when employee gave definite notice of intention 
to retire), Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding limitations 
period begins to run in constructive discharge cases on date of employee’s resignation), Am. Airlines, 
Inc. v. Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d 111, 123 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding constructive discharge was 
alleged discriminatory act that triggered limitations period), Hukkanen v. Int’l Union of Operating 
Eng’rs, Hoisting & Portable Local No. 101, 3 F.3d 281, 285 (8th Cir. 1993) (ruling constructive dis-
charge claim was timely based on employee’s date of resignation), and Young v. Nat’l Ctr. for Health 
Servs. Research, 828 F.2d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding employee’s claim was timely because 
constructive discharge is distinct adverse employment action). Constructive discharge occurs when 
working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would 
have felt compelled to resign. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004). 
 20 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (non-federal sector employees have 180 days to file a charge with the 
Commission); id. § 1614.103 (applying Title VII to federal employees, including the U.S. Postal Ser-
vice); id. § 1614.105 (declaring that federal sector employees “must initiate contact with a Counselor 
within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel ac-
tion, within 45 days of the effective date of the action”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, 
at 5 & n.2. 
 21 Compare Green II, 760 F.3d at 1143–45 (evaluating timeliness based on employer’s last act), 
Mayers, 478 F.3d at 370 (same), and Davidson, 953 F.2d at 1059–60 (same), with Flaherty, 235 F.3d 
at 138 (evaluating timeliness based on date of employee’s resignation), Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11 
(same), Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d at 123 (same), Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285 (same), and Young, 828 
F.2d at 239 (same). See generally Aaron Vehling, Justices to Eye Time Bar for Constructive Dis-
charge Claims, LAW360 (Apr. 27, 2015, 3:59 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/648079/justices-
to-eye-time-bar-for-constructive-discharge-claims [http://perma.cc/YG8T-5HEZ] (discussing U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision to grant Green’s certiorari petition). 
 22 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1143–45; Mayers, 478 F.3d at 370; Davidson, 953 F.2d at 1059–60. 
 23 See Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138; Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11; Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285; Young, 
828 F.2d at 239. 
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This Note argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should overturn the Tenth 
Circuit’s 2014 decision in Green v. Donahoe, which held that an employee’s 
constructive discharge claim began to accrue prior to his resignation.24 Part I of 
this Note outlines the legal context for Title VII constructive discharge claims 
and the current circuit split over when those claims begin to accrue.25 Part II of 
this Note discusses the implications of the circuit split, including its creation of 
uncertain outcomes and unequal results for similarly situated claimants.26 Part 
III of this Note recommends the U.S. Supreme Court resolve the circuit split 
by adopting the rule that a constructive discharge claim begins to accrue when 
the employee resigns.27 
I. DIFFERENT ZIP CODE, DIFFERENT TIMELINE: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER 
WHEN A TITLE VII CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE CLAIM  
BEGINS TO ACCRUE 
Federal statutes and regulations set deadlines for how long an employee has 
to undertake the actions required before suing for constructive discharge after the 
“alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”28 The U.S. Courts of Appeals 
are divided regarding whether the constructive discharge itself constitutes an 
alleged unlawful employment practice for the purpose of measuring time-
sensitive claims.29 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has considered when a 
wrongful termination action occurs for the purpose of a limitations period, it has 
yet to address the issue in the context of a constructive discharge claim.30 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See infra notes 201–249 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 28–143 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 144–200 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 201–249 and accompanying text. 
 28 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2012) (containing quoted language); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (de-
tailing general timeline); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 (detailing timeline for federal employees); see also 
Daniel M. Isaacs, Rebalancing Current Limitations Periods to Reflect a Society That Values Its Mem-
bers as Much as Their Money, 44 STETSON L. REV. 43, 63–64 (2014) (discussing negative effects of 
strict Title VII limitations periods). 
 29 Compare Green II, 760 F.3d at 1142–45 (holding constructive discharge claim time-barred 
because resignation is not unlawful employment practice and no other alleged discriminatory acts 
occurred during actionable limitations period), Mayers, 478 F.3d at 368, 370 (claim held to be time-
barred because constructive discharge required “one offending act within statutory period” despite 
employee’s resignation occurring within 180-day window), and Davidson, 953 F.2d at 1059–60 
(claim determined to be time-barred), with Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138 (holding constructive discharge 
claim timely based on date employee gave definite notice of intention to retire), Draper, 147 F.3d at 
1110–11 (claim timely based on date of resignation), Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d at 123 (claims 
time-barred based on date of resignation notice), Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285 (claim timely based on date 
of resignation), and Young, 828 F.2d at 239 (claim timely based on date of resignation). 
 30 See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258–59 (1980) (holding limitations period com-
menced to run when employee was given explicit notice that employment would end in one year); 
Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11 (citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258–59) (distinguishing constructively dis-
charged employee from discharged employee who was given definite notice of termination); Daniel 
Elms, Constructive Discharge Claim Accrues When Employer Retaliates, AM. BAR ASS’N, LITIG. 
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Section A of this Part outlines the relevant legal context of a Title VII 
constructive discharge claim.31 Section B of this Part outlines the circuit court 
decisions that have held an employee’s claim accrues when the employee re-
signs.32 Section C of this Part outlines the circuit court decisions that have held 
an employee’s claim accrues when the last adverse employment action oc-
curs.33 Section D of this Part discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s grant of cer-
tiorari to resolve the circuit split.34 
A. Constructive Discharge Claims Under Title VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of an employee’s race, color, religion, sex and national 
origin.35 Title VII led to the development of an incredibly complex area of law, 
which includes various analytical frameworks and divergent approach by low-
er courts to its statutory interpretation.36 Examples of unlawful employment 
practices under Title VII include discrete discriminatory acts (such as wrongful 
discharge or retaliation), hostile work environment, and constructive dis-
charge.37 A hostile work environment occurs when discriminatory harassment 
is so severe or pervasive that it alters the plaintiff’s employment conditions.38 
                                                                                                                           
NEWS (Dec. 9, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/120914-
constructive-discharge-claim.html [http://perma.cc/BR9G-H7YH] (noting that Equal Opportunity 
Employment Commission (“EEOC”) charge filing deadlines for constructive discharge claims may 
depend on adjudicating court’s location until U.S. Supreme Court resolves circuit split). 
 31 See infra notes 35–87 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 88–115 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 116–135 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 136–143 and accompanying text. 
 35 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . (1) to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 
477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (recognizing claim for hostile work environment under Title VII); Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401, 429–30 (1971) (holding discriminatory intent not required for employment 
practice to be unlawful under Title VII). 
 36 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103; C.F.R. § 1614.105; 
Martha Chamallas, Title VII’s Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 
307, 309–10 (2004) (discussing the difficulty lower courts have in classifying and uniformly handling 
constructive discharge cases arising under Title VII). 
 37 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2536 (2013) (retaliation and con-
structive discharge claims); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21–23 (1993) (hostile work environ-
ment claim); Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/ [http://perma.cc/A7TF-B3MU]. 
 38 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67) (finding company president’s 
suggestive comments, unwanted sexual innuendo, and gender-related insults were sufficient for hos-
tile work environment claim); see also Laura E. Diss, Note, Whether You “Like” It or Not: The Inclu-
sion of Social Media Evidence in Sexual Harassment Cases and How Courts Can Effectively Control 
It, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1841, 1847–49 (2013) (discussing the development of hostile work environment 
claim first recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson). 
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A wrongful discharge involves an employer firing an employee for an unlawful 
reason.39 A constructive discharge occurs when an employee resigns as a result 
of the employer’s actions.40 
Title VII constructive discharge claimants must exhaust their administra-
tive remedies, have actionable claims within the limitations period, and meet 
the requirements of a constructive discharge claim for substantive and remedial 
purposes.41 Subsection 1 below discusses the filing deadlines imposed on em-
ployees who allege discriminatory conduct in violation of Title VII.42 Subsec-
tion 2 explores the continuing violation doctrine and its abrogation for discrete 
act claims.43 Subsection 3 discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in 
Delaware State College v. Ricks regarding when Title VII claims accrue in a 
non-constructive discharge case.44 Subsection 4 provides an overview of con-
structive discharge claims.45 
1. Filing Deadlines to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 
Before filing a lawsuit alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII, 
aggrieved employees must exhaust their administrative remedies.46 Title VII 
requires that employees file their charge with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (“EEOC”) a certain number of days “after the alleged un-
                                                                                                                           
 39 See Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11 (noting constructive discharge is one form of wrongful dis-
charge); Discharge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “wrongful discharge” as 
“[a] discharge for reasons that are illegal or that violate public policy”). 
 40 See Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11.  
 41 See Chamallas, supra note 36, at 319–21 (discussing the evolution of substantive and remedial 
provisions in Title VII constructive discharge law, including the development of the intolerable condi-
tions standard and introduction of tort-like remedies in the 1991 Civil Rights Act); Katherine A. 
Macfarlane, The Improper Dismissal of Title VII Claims on “Jurisdictional” Exhaustion Grounds: 
How Federal Courts Require That Allegations Be Presented to an Agency Without the Resources to 
Consider Them, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 213, 218–20 (2011) (outlining an employee’s ad-
ministrative exhaustion requirements prior to filing a Title VII suit); Susan Strebel Sperber & Craig R. 
Welling, The Continuing Violations Doctrine Post-Morgan, 32 COLO. LAW. 57, 58 (2003) (discussing 
the elimination of discrete discriminatory acts from the continuing violations doctrine and each dis-
crete act needing to occur within limitations period to be actionable); see also Story v. Napolitano, 
771 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1252–53 (E.D. Wash. 2011) (finding plaintiff adequately exhausted administra-
tive remedies and presented viable constructive discharge claim, but could not recover for conduct 
outside limitations period). 
 42 See infra notes 46–57 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra notes 58–72 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 73–80 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 81–87 and accompanying text. 
 46 See Mayers, 478 F.3d at 367–68, 370 (rejecting a finding of liability against employer because 
employee failed to exhaust her administrative remedies due to untimely EEOC complaint); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1601.28 (2015) (outlining procedures for issuance of notice of right to sue from EEOC); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1614.105 (2015) (requiring aggrieved employees to initiate contact with EEOC counselor within 
specified time period). 
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lawful employment practice occurred.”47 The circuit courts have adopted dif-
ferent statutory interpretations of this provision, which has led to disparate re-
sults for employees’ constructive discharge claims.48 
In general, federal employees have a shorter window than private em-
ployees to act on their Title VII claims of discrimination.49 Pursuant to the 
Code of Federal Regulations, federal employees must initiate contact with an 
EEOC counselor within “45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be dis-
criminatory.”50 If the matter is not resolved, the counselor must inform the ag-
grieved employee in writing within thirty days of the initial contact with the 
counselor that the employee has the right to file a discrimination complaint.51 
The federal employee then has fifteen days after the receipt of the written no-
tice to file a complaint with the EEOC.52 Under Title VII, aggrieved employees 
may file in an appropriate U.S. District Court within ninety days of final action 
on the complaint or, if no final action has been taken by the EEOC, within 180 
days from the filing of a complaint.53 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). 
 48 Compare Green II, 760 F.3d at 1142–45 (holding constructive discharge claim time-barred 
because resignation is not unlawful employment practice and no other alleged discriminatory acts 
occurred during actionable limitations period), Mayers, 478 F.3d at 368, 370 (holding claim time-
barred because constructive discharge required “one offending act within statutory period” despite 
employee’s resignation occurring within 180-day window), and Davidson, 953 F.2d at 1059–60 (find-
ing claim time-barred), with Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138 (holding constructive discharge claim timely 
based on date employee gave definite notice of intention to retire), Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11 
(holding claim timely based on date of resignation), Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d at 123 (holding 
claims time-barred based on date of resignation notice), Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285 (finding claim timely 
based on date of resignation), and Young, 828 F.2d at 239 (holding claim timely based on date of 
resignation). 
 49 See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105; Kevin Bennardo, Claimants Beware: Strict Deadlines Limit Federal 
Employment Discrimination Suits, 97 ILL. B.J. 304, 305–06 (2009) (noting that non-federal employees 
must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within three hundred days of the act of discrimi-
nation, while federal employees “must act with even greater diligence” and consult with an EEO 
counselor within forty-five days of the discrimination); see also Bartlett v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 749 
F.3d 1, 2–3 (2014) (discussing how federal employee failed to contact EEO counselor within forty-
five-day time limit). 
 50 See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id. § 1614.407. If the aggrieved employee appeals the EEOC’s decision, he or she similarly 
has ninety days to file a complaint in U.S. District Court from the date of the final decision on the 
appeal or 180 days from the filing of the appeal, if there has not been a final decision on the appeal by 
the EEOC. See id. The EEOC goes on to explain: 
Prior to filing a civil action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, a federal sector complainant must first exhaust the administrative 
process set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614. “Exhaustion” for the purposes of filing a civil 
action may occur at different stages of the process. The regulations provide that civil 
actions may be filed in an appropriate federal court: (1) within 90 days of receipt of the 
final action where no administrative appeal has been filed; (2) after 180 days from the 
date of filing a complaint if an administrative appeal has not been filed and final action 
1620 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1613 
The time limits for the administrative exhaustion requirement of non-
federal employees’ Title VII claims are less demanding than for federal em-
ployees.54 Non-federal employees must make a charge to the EEOC within 180 
days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”55 This filing 
period can be extended to three hundred days if the aggrieved employee first 
files a charge with an appropriate state or local Fair Employment Practice 
Agency.56 These Title VII limitations periods operate as a statute of limitations, 
and therefore, claims based on discrimination that did not occur within these 
filing windows are almost always time-barred, unless they can be salvaged by 
the continuing violation doctrine.57 
2. The Continuing Violation Doctrine and Its Abrogation for Discrete 
Discriminatory Act Claims 
The continuing violation doctrine allows events that occur outside the 
limitations period to serve as a basis for a claim as long as they are considered 
part of a single unlawful employment practice.58 Title VII plaintiffs often re-
                                                                                                                           
has not been taken; (3) within 90 days of receipt of EEOC’s final decision on an appeal; 
or (4) after 180 days from the filing of an appeal with EEOC if there has been no final 
decision by the EEOC. 
See Federal EEO Complaint Processing Procedures, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fedprocess.cfm [http://perma.cc/3PPQ-V3X6] (citing 29 
C.F.R. § 1614.408). 
 54 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (2015); Eboneé N. Hamilton et al., Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 521, 533–39 (2001) (outlining Title VII’s 
filing procedures, including time limitations for filing EEOC charge and trial court complaint). 
 55 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13; Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, 
The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 866–67 (2008) (describing 
“unusually short” statute of limitations as “root of the problem for rights-claiming under Title VII”). 
 56 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13; Hamilton et al., supra note 54, at 534 
(noting existence of state or local anti-discrimination agency in certain jurisdictions extends EEOC 
charge filing deadlines). 
 57 See, e.g., Draper, 147 F.3d at 1107–09 (salvaging otherwise time-barred claim through use of 
continuing violation doctrine); see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393–94 
(“We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequi-
site to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, 
estoppel, and equitable tolling.”). 
 58 See Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The continuing viola-
tion theory allows for consideration of incidents that occurred outside the time bar when those inci-
dents are part of a single, ongoing pattern of discrimination . . . .”); Kyle Graham, The Continuing 
Violations Doctrine, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 271, 302–03 (2008) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
2002 holding in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan that the “‘entire hostile work envi-
ronment encompasses a single unlawful employment practice’ because the ‘very nature’ of a hostile 
work environment ‘involves repeated conduct’” (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 
U.S. 101, 109–17 (2002))). For example, an employee can rely on the continuing violation doctrine to 
include past acts of sexual harassment by her supervisor as a basis for a hostile work environment 
claim. See Graham, supra at 302–03. In order to prevail on this theory, the employee must demon-
strate that this pattern of sexual harassment by her supervisor continued into the relevant period of 
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lied on the continuing violation doctrine to include discriminatory acts in their 
claim that would otherwise be time-barred.59 The continuing violation doctrine 
is somewhat notorious for causing confusion and being applied inconsistently 
by courts.60 
There are two important types of continuing violations analyzed by courts 
in Title VII cases: serial and systemic.61 Systemic violations involve company-
wide policies or practices that continued into the limitations period.62 Serial 
violations comprise a series of distinct discriminatory acts against an individu-
al employee.63 Under a serial violations theory, the most recent discriminatory 
act by the employer could serve as the date of accrual for the limitations period 
and pull otherwise time-barred discriminatory acts into the claim.64 
Serial violations encompassed claims for both a series of discrete discrim-
inatory acts and hostile work environment.65 Courts created the claim of hos-
tile work environment to combat harassment that did not fit within the tradi-
                                                                                                                           
limitations. See id. If the employee alleges that her supervisor harassed her daily, but only the last day 
of her employment is within the limitations period, the employee can rely on the continuing violation 
doctrine to include all the acts of discrimination as a basis for her hostile work environment claim. See 
id. 
 59 See Graham, supra note 58 at 272–73 & n.6; see also Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 239–
40 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that continuing violation doctrine made hostile work environment claim 
timely, but doctrine could not be applied to specific instances of demotion and failure to promote); 
Williams v. Silver Spring Volunteer Fire Dep’t, No. GJH-13-2514, 2015 WL 237146, at *16 (D. Md. 
Jan. 16, 2015) (applying continuing violation doctrine to allow incidents outside of charge filing peri-
od to be included in hostile work environment claim). 
 60 See Davidson v. Am. Online, 337 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting the “inconsistent 
and confusing application” of the continuing violation doctrine by the circuit courts before the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan); Lisa S. Tsai, Note, Continuing Confusion: The Application of 
the Continuing Violation Doctrine to Sexual Harassment Law, 79 TEX. L. REV. 531, 531 (2000) (dis-
cussing how the continuing violation doctrine is considered “one of the most confusing and incon-
sistent areas of employment discrimination law”). 
 61 See Graham, supra note 58 at 303–04 (citing O’Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 
731 (1st Cir. 2001)). 
 62 See id. at 304 (“Systemic violations alleged that a discriminatory policy or practice that origi-
nated outside of the limitations period prior to the filing of a charge remained in effect within that 
period.”). The cases involved in the current circuit split discussed in this Note do not involve systemic 
violations. See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1143–45 (no discussion of systemic violations); Mayers, 478 
F.3d at 370 (same); Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11 (same); Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138 (same); Cardoza-
Rodriguez, 133 F.3d at 123 (same); Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285 (same); Davidson, 953 F.2d at 1059–60 
(same); Young, 828 F.2d at 239 (same). 
 63 See Graham, supra note 58, at 303–04; Tsai, supra note 60, at 540. 
 64 See Graham, supra note 58, at 304 (explaining that a serial violation occurs “when the defend-
ant commit[s] a series of discriminatory acts directed against a single plaintiff” as long as an anchor-
ing discriminatory act occurred within the charge filing window). 
 65 See id. (discussing the Court’s treatment of hostile work environment and discrete discrimina-
tory act claims under continuing violation doctrine in Morgan); see also Draper, 147 F.3d at 1108 
(stating that because employee’s “hostile work environment claim is not based upon a series of dis-
crete and unrelated discriminatory actions, but is instead premised upon a series of closely related 
similar occurrences her allegations set forth a claim of a continuing violation”). 
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tional “economic” or “tangible” forms of employment discrimination under 
Title VII.66 Courts often describe a hostile work environment as a workplace 
“polluted” or “permeated” with discrimination.67 In a constructive discharge 
case, a hostile work environment that involves repeated or continuous conduct 
that compels the employee to resign would presumably be treated as one un-
lawful employment practice, and thus, the hostile work environment exists un-
til the employee resigns.68 
The development of hostile work environment jurisprudence has eroded 
the already muddled continuing violation doctrine.69 In 2002, in National Rail-
road Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the contin-
uing violation doctrine did not apply to a series of discrete discriminatory acts, 
but that it could still be applied to an employee’s hostile work environment 
claims.70 The Court ruled that each discrete act, such as termination or denial 
of transfer, should constitute a “separate actionable unlawful employment 
practice” and must actually occur within the limitations period to be actiona-
ble.71 The abrogation of the continuing violation doctrine imputes greater sig-
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780, 786 (1998) (discussing U.S. Supreme 
Court’s recognition of hostile work environment claims); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (rejecting employ-
er’s argument that Title VII limited to “economic” and “tangible” discrimination because Title VII 
intended “‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in employment” 
(quoting L.A. Dep’t. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 707, 707 n.13 (1978))). 
 67 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (“When the workplace is 
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive 
to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, Title 
VII is violated.” (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–23)); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (“One can readily envi-
sion working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emo-
tional and psychological stability of minority group workers . . . .” (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 
F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971))). 
 68 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122 (“A charge alleging a hostile work environment claim, however, 
will not be time-barred so long as all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful 
employment practice and at least one act falls within the time period.”); Draper, 147 F.3d at 1108 
(detailing claims of an employee that hostile work environment continued until her final day on the 
job). 
 69 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114–15 (creating distinction between hostile work environment and 
discrete discriminatory act claims under constructive discharge doctrine); Graham, supra note 58, at 
304 (“The Morgan court abrogated serial violations (except insofar as hostile work environment 
claims are concerned) and cast the fate of systemic violations into doubt.”); Sperber & Welling, supra 
note 41, at 59 (noting the Morgan decision made it easier for employers to defend against discrete act 
discrimination claims because employees can no longer rely on continuing violations doctrine to ex-
tend filing period for discrete act claims). 
 70 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114–17; Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To File (Again) or Not to File 
(Again): The Post-Morgan Circuit Split Over the Duty to File an Amended or Second EEOC Charge 
for Claims of Post-Charge Employer Retaliation, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 531, 550–51 (2014) (discussing 
the Court’s holding in Morgan that discrete discriminatory act claims begin to accrue on the date they 
actually occurred for purposes of the limitations period). 
 71 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114–17; Jones v. Calvert Grp., 551 F.3d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(distinguishing holding in Morgan regarding charge filing period for discrete discriminatory act from 
filing requirements for post-charge discriminatory incidents). 
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nificance on determining when a discrete discriminatory act occurs for the 
purposes of claim accrual.72 
3. Title VII Claim Accrual in Delaware State College v. Ricks 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed when constructive 
discharge claims accrue, but the Court has considered when an unlawful em-
ployment practice claim accrues.73 In 1980, in Delaware State College v. Ricks, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a claim begins to accrue at the time of the 
alleged discriminatory act, rather than at time of the unlawful termination.74 
Although decided before Morgan, the Court in Ricks declined to apply the con-
tinuing violation doctrine to link the employee’s last day of employment with 
the employer’s last discriminatory act for purposes of extending the limitations 
period.75 
The plaintiff in Ricks alleged he was denied tenure because he was dis-
criminated against on the basis of his national origin.76 After being denied ten-
ure, the college offered the plaintiff a one-year “terminal” contract, at the end 
of which his employment would expire.77 The Court determined that this ter-
minal contract was customary procedure for a professor who was denied ten-
ure, and thus the termination of his employment could not be construed as an 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See Sperber & Welling, supra note 41, at 59 (noting that after the Morgan decision “discrete 
act claims are considered ‘different in kind’ from hostile work environment claims in that the filing 
period for such claims can be extended only through equitable doctrines such as tolling”). 
 73 See Elms, supra note 30. But see Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258–59 (holding that unlawful employment 
practice occurred at notice of tenure denial and not end of employee’s employment). The issue of 
when a constructive discharge claim accrues has arisen several times at the circuit court level. See 
Green II, 760 F.3d at 1143–45; Mayers, 478 F.3d at 370; Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138; Draper, 147 F.3d 
at 1110–11; Davidson, 953 F.2d at 1059–60; Young, 828 F.2d at 239. A wrongful discharge is a dis-
charge based on an illegal reason, which requires action only by the employer. See Flaherty, 235 F.3d 
at 138. A constructive discharge occurs when an employee resigns due to intolerable working condi-
tions, and therefore, requires action by both the employer and employee. See id. at 138–39. 
 74 See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258–59. In Ricks, the plaintiff failed to include a claim for discriminatory 
discharge in his complaint and only alleged discrimination regarding his denial of tenure. See id. at 257. 
The plaintiff later argued he was discriminatorily discharged, which the Court rejected both because the 
complaint alleged no facts supporting this argument and based on its analysis of when his discrimination 
claim accrued. See id. at 257–58. Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that he would treat the case where 
an employee is denied tenure and offered a one-year terminal contract as a discharge case, and therefore, 
the limitations period would begin to run on the termination date of the one-year terminal contract. See 
id. at 266 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 75 See id. at 257 (majority opinion). 
 76 See id. at 252. The employee was a black Liberian who began working at the college in 1970. 
See id. He was first passed over for tenure in February 1973, although the college’s trustees did not 
formally vote to deny tenure until March 1974. See id.  
 77 See id. at 252–54 (noting employee immediately began internal grievance procedures after 
receiving tenure denial, but did not file his Title VII lawsuit until three years later). 
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alleged discriminatory act.78 The Court created a temporal distinction between 
discriminatory acts and their consequences in determining when a claim begins 
to accrue.79 Therefore, the Court concluded that it was the denial of tenure—
not the employment termination that resulted from the denied tenure—that was 
the alleged discriminatory act.80 
4. The Doctrine of Constructive Discharge 
Courts have interpreted Title VII to permit constructive discharge claims 
since its enactment as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.81 A court must find 
a constructive discharge when an employer discriminates against an employee 
and intentionally makes working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable 
person in the employee’s position would feel compelled to resign.82 Courts 
developed the concept of constructive discharge to expand remedies for illegal 
employment practices to employees who felt forced to resign due to discrimi-
natory employment conditions.83 
The doctrine of constructive discharge allows plaintiffs to recover from 
employers who would otherwise escape liability solely because the employee 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See id. at 258; Megan E. Mowrey, Discriminatory Pay and Title VII: Filing a Timely Claim, 41 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 342–43 (2008) (discussing Court’s balancing in Ricks between Title VII’s 
protections and limitations periods). 
 79 See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258 (“[T]he proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not 
upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.” (quoting Abramson v. 
Univ. of Haw., 594 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir. 1979))). 
 80 See id. In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the date of discharge should trigger the claim 
accrual because it is the most sensible and easily-administered approach. See id. at 267 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that the alleged discriminatory action is subject to change until the 
employee is actually discharged. See id. Furthermore, Justice Stevens noted that the date of discharge 
is generally easier to identify than the date the employer decided to terminate or the date notice of 
termination is given to the employee. See id. 
 81 See Suders, 542 U.S. at 141–42 (discussing development of constructive discharge in employ-
ment discrimination jurisprudence). The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) developed the 
constructive discharge doctrine in the 1930s as a response to employers who would either force em-
ployees to resign or make working conditions so intolerable that employees would feel compelled to 
resign as retaliation for employee’s union-related activities. See id. When Title VII was enacted in 
1964, the constructive discharge doctrine was well established in federal employment law and the 
federal courts recognized constructive discharge claims in Title VII cases. See NLRB v. Saxe-
Glassman Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d 238, 243 (1st Cir. 1953) (upholding NLRB’s finding that employee 
was constructively discharged due to sufficient evidence that employer’s actions were intended to 
make employee’s job unbearable); NLRB v. E. Tex. Motor Freight Lines, 140 F.2d 404, 405–06 (5th 
Cir. 1944) (upholding NLRB’s finding in favor of employees pressured to resign due to their union 
activities, although not using term “constructive discharge”). 
 82 See Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138 (finding constructive discharge claim was not time-barred); 
Young, 828 F.2d at 237–38 (finding plaintiff sufficiently pled constructive discharge).  
 83 Green II, 760 F.3d at 1142–43 (discussing rationale of recognizing constructive discharge as a 
distinct claim). 
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resigned.84 In determining damages, courts treat constructive discharge the 
same as actual termination, meaning the plaintiff may recover compensatory 
and punitive damages.85 An important difference between constructive dis-
charge and an actual discharge, however, is that constructive discharge requires 
action by both the employer and employee.86 Only the employee knows when 
working conditions have become so intolerable that he or she must resign, and 
therefore the specific timing of the constructive discharge is under the employ-
ee’s control.87 
B. Circuit Courts That Hold a Constructive Discharge Claim Accrues When 
the Employee Resigns 
Five U.S. Courts of Appeals have held that an employee’s constructive 
discharge claim begins to accrue on the date that the employee gives definitive 
notice of resignation.88 In 1987, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit held in Young v. National Center for Health Services Research that a con-
structive discharge could be considered a distinct discriminatory act.89 The 
plaintiff in Young was a federal employee and required by EEO regulations to 
bring her grievance to an EEO counselor within thirty days.90 The plaintiff 
contacted an EEO counselor twenty-nine days after her resignation.91 The 
Fourth Circuit determined that the constructive discharge was a distinct ad-
verse employment action.92 The court concluded that the plaintiff had properly 
exhausted her administrative remedies because the alleged unlawful employ-
                                                                                                                           
 84 See id. (noting remedies that would be unavailable to plaintiffs if constructive discharge claim 
did not exist). 
 85 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2012) (allowing compensatory and punitive damages in cases of 
intentional discrimination in employment); Suders, 542 U.S. at 147–48 & n.8 (discussing compensato-
ry and punitive damages allowed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)). 
 86 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1142–43 (noting constructive discharge involves both employer’s 
discriminatory conduct and employee’s decision to leave); Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138 (stating “[i]n the 
case of constructive discharge, it is only the employee who can know when the atmosphere has been 
made so intolerable by the discrimination-motivated employer that the employee must leave”). 
 87 Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138 (noting employee made decision regarding when to give definite 
notice of intent to retire due to allegedly intolerable working conditions). 
 88 See Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138; Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11; Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d at 
123; Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285; Young, 828 F.2d at 239. 
 89 See Young, 828 F.2d at 238. The plaintiff alleged her employer discriminated against her on the 
basis of her national origin. Id. at 236. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed her supervisor made abusive 
comments, denied her sick and annual leave, and blocked her access to training facilities. Id. at 237. 
Further, the plaintiff alleged her agency’s director would not address her grievances until she resigned, 
and therefore, she was improperly suspended and forced to resign. Id. 
 90 See id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(1)(i) (1986). The current federal regulation requires federal 
employees to initiate contact with an EEOC counselor within forty-five days of the alleged discrimi-
natory matter. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). 
 91 Young, 828 F.2d at 238 (finding plaintiff sufficiently pled “constructive discharge” in her EEO 
complaint even though she did not use those precise words). 
 92 Id. at 237–38. 
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ment practice—the constructive discharge—was within the reporting win-
dow.93 
In Young, the court reasoned that a resignation itself is not a distinct act if 
it is solely the result of past discrimination and does not rise to the level of 
constructive discharge.94 The Fourth Circuit defined constructive discharge as 
when an employer discriminates against an employee and makes his or her job 
conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position 
would feel forced to resign.95 Because the court concluded that the construc-
tive discharge itself was a distinct discriminatory act, the court held that the 
limitations period began to accrue once the employee resigned.96 
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in 1993, 
in Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Hoisting & Port-
able Local No. 101, that the employee’s Title VII constructive discharge claim 
was timely based on the date of her resignation.97 The Eighth Circuit found 
that the employee filed her EEOC claim within the required 180 days of the 
union’s last act of discrimination against her, which the court determined was 
the effective date of the constructive discharge.98 Under the continuing viola-
tion doctrine, the union’s prior acts of discrimination could be included in 
plaintiff’s claim because she alleged and proved a pattern of discrimination 
that culminated in her constructive discharge, which was within the limitations 
period.99 
Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s 1998 decision 
in American Airlines v. Cardoza-Rodriguez held that employees’ claims were 
time-barred, the court nevertheless used the employees’ resignation notice 
dates to calculate when their claims began to accrue.100 In Cardoza-Rodriguez, 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Id. (noting defendant has burden of proving affirmative defense that plaintiff did not exhaust 
administrative remedies). 
 94 See id. (distinguishing constructive discharge from “inevitable consequence” of prior discrimi-
nation (quoting Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257–58)). 
 95 See id. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that a resignation that is a constructive discharge is “a distinct 
discriminatory ‘act’ for which there is a distinct cause of action.” See id. at 238 (citing Bristow v. Daily 
Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 
633, 672 (4th Cir. 1983)). 
 96 See id. at 237–38. 
 97 See Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285 (rejecting union’s argument that employee’s claim was time-
barred). 
 98 See id. (court did not identify any specific discriminatory act by employer within limitations 
period). 
 99 See id. (stating limitations periods do not begin to run until “last occurrence of discrimination” 
when Title VII violations are “continuing in nature”). 
 100 See Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d at 123 (finding constructive discharge claims were time-
barred based on date of resignation notice). In contrast to the Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Cir-
cuit decisions that also follow the date-of-resignation rule, the employees’ constructive discharge 
claims in Cardoza-Rodriguez were time-barred under either a date-of-resignation or date-of-last-
discriminatory-act approach. Compare Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138 (claim timely), Draper, 147 F.3d at 
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the employer made allegedly discriminatory early retirement offers to older 
employees, which they had approximately two months to accept or risk invol-
untary termination.101 The court calculated the limitations period based on the 
date of each employee’s individual notice of resignation, not the date on which 
the employer made the alleged discriminatory offer.102 The Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in Young influenced the First Circuit to conclude that the constructive 
discharge itself was the alleged discriminatory act that triggered the limitations 
period.103 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 1998 decision in 
Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc. also comported with the Fourth Circuit’s 
Young formula by holding that periods of limitation begin to run in construc-
tive discharge cases on the date of the resignation.104 In Draper, the employee 
alleged a hostile work environment due to sexual harassment by her supervi-
sor, which resulted in her constructive discharge.105 The majority of the super-
visor’s discriminatory behavior that constituted plaintiff’s claim occurred be-
fore the actionable limitations period.106 
In determining whether the constructive discharge claim was timely filed, 
the Ninth Circuit ruled in Draper that the date of resignation triggers the limi-
tations period in a constructive discharge case.107 The Ninth Circuit considered 
constructive discharge a form of a wrongful discharge claim, but distinguished 
constructive discharge from a wrongful discharge that was an inexorable result 
of a prior action, such as denial of tenure resulting in termination.108 The court 
reasoned that the constructive discharge was not an inevitable consequence of 
unlawful employment action, but a distinct action that requires autonomous 
                                                                                                                           
1110–11 (claim timely), Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285 (claim timely), and Young, 828 F.2d at 239 (claim 
timely), with Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d at 123 (claim time-barred). 
 101 See Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d  at 114, 122 & n.12 (including chart with dates employees 
accepted allegedly discriminatory retirement offer and filed administrative charges). 
 102 See id. at 123 (finding employee’s acceptance of allegedly discriminatory retirement offer was 
latest possible date the limitations period could begin to run). 
 103 See id. (rejecting plaintiffs’ arguments that the limitations period began to run on each indi-
vidual employee’s last day or the date they were actually replaced by younger workers (citing Young, 
828 F.2d at 238)). 
 104 See Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11 (overturning lower court’s finding that constructive dis-
charge itself is not an act of discrimination under Title VII). 
 105 See id. at 1105, 1108 n.1 (noting hostile work environment may not require showing of dis-
crete discriminatory act within limitations period, but concluding that employee’s constructive dis-
charge nevertheless constituted such an act). 
 106 See id. at 1107. The court identified one incident, in which the employee confronted her su-
pervisor about his sexual harassment, as a distinct discriminatory act that occurred within the limita-
tions period. See id. at 1109. The court found this violation sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as 
to whether the hostile work environment continued into the relevant limitations period under the con-
tinuing violation doctrine. See id. 
 107 See id. at 1110. 
 108 See id. (noting employer’s reliance on Ricks was “misplaced” because plaintiff in that case 
failed to properly plead wrongful termination (citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257–58)). 
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decision making by the employee.109 Therefore, the court concluded, the plain-
tiff’s constructive discharge was an act of discrimination under Title VII and 
the claim was properly within the limitations period.110 
Finally, in 2000, in Flaherty v. Metromail Corp., the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff’s constructive discharge 
claim accrued on the date she gave definite notice of her intention to retire.111 
The plaintiff in Flaherty alleged unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex 
and age.112 The lower court found that the latest discriminatory act against the 
plaintiff, her employer’s issuance of a warning letter about her “looming ter-
mination,” occurred outside of the limitations period and the complaint was 
time-barred.113 The Second Circuit reversed and ruled that constructive dis-
charge claims accrue on the date of the employee’s definite notice of resigna-
tion, and thus her complaint was filed within the limitations period.114 The 
court noted that only the employee knows when the employer’s discriminatory 
practices have made working conditions so unbearable that the employee must 
resign, and thus it is the employee’s decision to resign that should trigger the 
limitations period.115 
C. Circuit Courts That Hold a Constructive Discharge Claim Accrues When 
the Last Adverse Employment Action Occurs 
The Seventh, Tenth, and District of Columbia Courts of Appeals adopted 
a contrasting approach for determining whether the last act of discrimination 
was within the limitations period by rejecting constructive discharge as a dis-
tinct discriminatory act by the employer.116 In 1992, in Davidson v. Indiana-
American Water Works, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held 
that the plaintiff’s claim was time-barred because the last alleged discriminato-
                                                                                                                           
 109 See id. (distinguishing case from Ricks because constructive discharge is not “inevitable con-
sequence of the employer’s actions,” as it also requires action by employee). 
 110 See id. at 1110–11 (reversing lower court’s grant of summary judgment to employer on con-
structive discharge claim). 
 111 See Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138–39 (vacating lower court’s grant of summary judgment). 
 112 See id. at 134–36 (discussing ageist and sexists remarks allegedly made to employee by super-
visors). 
 113 See id. at 135–38 (employee received warning letter on August 21, 1996, gave normal notice 
of retirement on June 12, 1997, and filed an EEOC charge on February 9, 1998); Flaherty v. Metro-
mail Corp., No. 98 CIV 8611 NRB, 2000 WL 288356, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2000) (rejecting em-
ployee’s argument that claim accrued on date of resignation), vacated, 235 F.3d 133. 
 114 See Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 136–38 (calculating date three hundred days prior to EEOC charge-
filing date and finding employee’s claim timely because date of resignation was within this actionable 
time period). 
 115 See id. at 138 (relying on substantive constructive discharge law). 
 116 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1143–45 (employer’s allegedly discriminatory last act was settle-
ment agreement); Mayers, 478 F.3d at 367–70 (employer’s last allegedly discriminatory act was fail-
ure to provide electric tools); Davidson, 953 F.2d at 1059–60 (employer’s last allegedly discriminato-
ry act was prior to employee’s department transfer). 
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ry act against the plaintiff was when she was transferred out of her department, 
not when she later resigned and claimed constructive discharge.117 In her com-
plaint, the plaintiff alleged that a hostile work environment based on age dis-
crimination and a pattern of retaliation led to her constructive discharge.118 The 
Seventh Circuit did not categorize the constructive discharge as a distinct vio-
lation for the purposes of the limitations period, but as a consequence of a pri-
or, time-barred discriminatory act.119 
In addition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit’s 2007 decision in Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & Safety Fund of North 
America held that the plaintiff failed to identify a single act of discrimination 
within the limitations period even though the alleged constructive discharge 
happened during the actionable time frame.120 In Mayers, the plaintiff alleged 
unlawful discrimination on the basis of disability, her rheumatoid arthritis, 
which resulted in her constructive discharge.121 The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit concluded that the plaintiff failed to predicate the constructive discharge 
on an act of intentional discrimination or retaliation.122 According to the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, constructive discharge is not an act of discrimination 
or retaliation by the employer for the purposes of claim accrual.123 
Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held in its 2014 
decision in Green v. Donahoe that a discriminatory act, other than the employ-
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Davidson, 953 F.2d at 1059–60 (employee’s EEOC charge filed in July 1986 was time-
barred based on her October 1985 department transfer and not her January 1986 resignation). The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court finding that the plaintiff’s EEOC charge was untimely based 
on the date of her supervisor’s last discriminatory act. See id. The plaintiff alleged age discrimination 
by her supervisor, but she was transferred out of that supervisor’s department in October 1985. See id. 
The court concluded that her claim began to accrue on the date of her transfer, not when she actually 
resigned in January 1986. See id. 
 118 See id. at 1058–59 (employee was transferred to another department after complaining that her 
supervisor harassed and discriminated against her on the basis of her age). 
 119 See id. (rejecting employee’s argument that constructive discharge claim began to run on last 
day of work). 
 120 See Mayers, 478 F.3d at 370 (implicitly rejecting date of resignation as moment when con-
structive discharge claim began to accrue). 
 121 See id. at 366–68 (noting that the Americans with Disabilities Act incorporates procedural 
provisions of Title VII, including EEOC charge filing requirement). 
 122 See id. at 370 (finding constructive discharge “must be predicated on a showing of either in-
tentional discrimination, or retaliation” to be actionable (quoting Carter v. George Wash. Univ., 387 
F.3d 872, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2004))). 
 123 See id. at 367–70. Furthermore, the District of Columbia Circuit noted in Mayers that the low-
er court’s decision improperly weighed evidence in summary judgment proceedings when evaluating 
plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim. See id. at 370. The District of Columbia Circuit determined 
this dismissal was inconsequential, however, because the district court correctly concluded that the 
constructive discharge claim should be disposed of on summary judgment due to the limitations peri-
od. See id.; Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & Safety Fund of N. Am., 404 F. Supp. 2d 59, 61 (D.D.C. 
2005) (district court decision granting summary judgment for employer because employee failed to 
establish constructive discharge), aff’d, 478 F.3d 364. 
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ee’s notice of resignation, must happen within the limitations period.124 The 
plaintiff in Green alleged illegal retaliation in violation of Title VII after he had 
previously filed a formal charge with the EEOC alleging that he had been de-
nied a promotion because of his race.125 The plaintiff claimed that his construc-
tive discharge, along with four other alleged retaliatory acts, was an illegal dis-
criminatory action.126 The court determined that plaintiff’s constructive dis-
charge was time-barred because the claim began to accrue when his employer 
last unlawfully threatened him, in December 2009, and not when he actually 
resigned, in March 2010.127 The court warned that allowing the claim to accrue 
on the date of resignation would allow the employee to have unilateral control 
over when to bring the claim.128 
Unlike the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits’ decisions, in 
Green, the Tenth Circuit explicitly acknowledged the differing approaches tak-
en by the Second, Ninth, and Fourth Circuits.129 The Tenth Circuit criticized 
Flaherty, Draper, and Young for going beyond the language of EEO federal 
regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1).130 The federal regulation requires that 
aggrieved federal employees initiate contact with an EEOC counselor “within 
45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory.”131 The Tenth 
Circuit rejected the act of constructive discharge as a sufficient alleged dis-
criminatory action for the purposes of the limitations period because it is the 
unilateral decision of the employee when to resign.132 
In Green, the Tenth Circuit weighed the merits of the two different ap-
proaches the circuits have taken to determining when constructive discharge 
claims accrue.133 The court noted the paradox that might be created if an em-
ployee cannot complain of a constructive discharge until he or she quits, but 
nevertheless, the court held the constructive discharge itself cannot be the sole 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1145. 
 125 See id. at 1137. 
 126 See id. at 1138–39 (affirming lower court’s disposition of four claims, including constructive 
discharge, but vacating summary judgment for emergency placement claim). 
 127 See id. at 1143–45. 
 128 See id. at 1144–45 (worrying date-of-resignation approach would place “supposed statute of 
repose in the sole hands of the party seeking relief”). 
 129 See id. at 1144 (“[I]n several decisions under Title VII, courts have said that a claim accrued 
on the date the employee resigned.” (citing Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138; Draper, 147 F.3d at 1111; 
Young, 828 F.2d at 237–38)). 
 130 See id. (“[W]e cannot endorse the legal fiction that the employee’s resignation, or notice of 
resignation, is a ‘discriminatory act’ of the employer. Such a fiction stretches the language of 29 
C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) too far.”). 
 131 See id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). 
 132 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1144–45. 
 133 See id. (contrasting Flaherty, Draper, and Young date-of-resignation decisions with Mayers 
and Davidson v. Indiana-American Water Works last-discriminatory-act decisions). 
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discriminatory act within the limitation periods.134 The court proposed that 
employees should initiate contact with the EEOC when the discriminatory acts 
occur and if the employee subsequently feels forced to resign, he or she can 
amend the charge to include a constructive discharge claim.135 
D. The U.S. Supreme Court Grants Certiorari to Resolve the Circuit Split  
After the Tenth Circuit’s decision, Green filed a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari, which was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court in April 2014.136 Oral 
argument in Green v. Brennan is scheduled for the Court’s 2015 October 
Term.137 The U.S. Solicitor General, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., wrote in a letter to 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court that the government will not defend the ra-
tionale of the Court of Appeals decision, but it will continue to defend the 
judgment itself because the government believes that outcome is the same even 
using Green’s proposed rule for determining when the constructive discharge 
claims accrue.138 Verrilli suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court may wish to 
invite amicus curiae to file a brief to defend the rationale of the Court of Ap-
peals’ decision.139 On July 28, 2015, the Court invited Catherine M.A. Carroll, 
Esq., to brief and argue the case in support of the Court of Appeals judg-
ment.140 
                                                                                                                           
 134 See id. at 1145 (“We recognize that an employee cannot file suit before presenting a charge in 
administrative proceedings, and a constructive-discharge charge cannot be submitted before the em-
ployee quits his job.”). 
 135 See id. The court posited that an employee could “likely” amend his or her EEOC charge after 
resigning to add a constructive discharge claim. See id. (noting that 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) permits 
amendments). 
 136 See id. (certiorari granted Apr. 27, 2015); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 1–2; 
Kimberley Bennett, Supreme Court to Rule in Standing, Labor Law Cases, JURIST PAPER CHASE 
BLOG (Apr. 27, 2015, 12:45 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2015/04/supreme-court-to-rule-in-
standing-labor-law-cases.php [http://perma.cc/L35C-NHAS] (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
grant of certiorari in Green II). 
 137 See October Term 2016, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/terms/ot2015/ 
[http://perma.cc/5WLU-627N] (noting that Green II is scheduled for the Court’s October term). In Feb-
ruary 2014, Megan Brennan succeeded Patrick Donahoe as U.S. Postmaster General. Lisa Rein, New 
Postmaster General Pledges ‘Faster Pace of Change’ During Swearing in, WASH. POST FED. EYE BLOG 
(Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2015/03/06/new-postmaster-
general-pledges-faster-pace-of-change-during-swearing-in/ [http://perma.cc/5QJ7-WYSM]. As a result, 
the case before the U.S. Supreme Court is now called Green v. Brennan. See J. Appendix, Green v. 
Brennan, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (July 6, 2015) (No. 14-613), 2015 WL 4148731. 
 138 Letter from Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor Gen., to the Honorable Scott S. Harris, Clerk, 
Supreme Court of the U.S. (June 30, 2015), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/
07/SG-letter-re-the-Marvin-Green-case.pdf [http://perma.cc/C4M7-H82B] (noting government did not 
express opinion about correctness of rationale of Court of Appeals decision when it opposed certiora-
ri). 
 139 See id. 
 140 Green v. Brennan, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/green-v-
donahoe/ [http://perma.cc/25CS-PSRM]. 
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Additionally, two amici curiae have filed briefs in support of Green.141 
The NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., and National Women’s 
Law Center filed a joint amicus brief advocating for the date-of-resignation 
rule for constructive discharge claim accrual because they believe it is more 
equitable and easier to administer.142 Similarly, the amicus brief submitted by 
the National Employment Lawyers Association argues that it is much more 
intuitive for employees to have a constructive discharge claim only once they 
have actually resigned.143 
II. BAD TIMING: UNCERTAINTY AND INEQUITY CREATED BY THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The current circuit split regarding when Title VII constructive discharge 
claims begin to accrue creates uncertain and unequal results for both employ-
ers and employees.144 Section A of this Part analyzes the implications of treat-
ing constructive discharge itself as a distinct adverse employment action.145 
Section B of this Part analyzes how geographical differences create unequal 
results that may be dispositive.146 Section C of this Part analyzes how this cir-
cuit split affects administrative efficiency.147 
A. Treating Constructive Discharge as a Distinct Adverse Employment Action 
The abrogation of the continuing violation doctrine for a series of distinct 
acts—essentially all non-hostile work environment claims—places a greater 
burden on employees to prove each distinct act is within the limitations peri-
od.148 In 2002, in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that distinct discriminatory acts must actually be within the 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See id. 
 142 Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. & the National Wom-
en’s Law Center in Support of Petitioner at 26, Green, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (July 13, 2015) (calling date-
of-resignation approach “simple, fair, and administrable”). 
 143 Brief Amicus Curiae for the National Employment Lawyers Ass’n in Support of Petitioner at 
4, Green, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (July 13, 2015) (arguing reasonable employee would not anticipate having 
to complain of discrimination underlying constructive discharge claim prior to resignation, while more 
sophisticated employer could take advantage of counterintuitive deadlines). 
 144 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 16–19; Elms, supra note 30. 
 145 See infra notes 148–174 and accompanying text. 
 146 See infra notes 175–192 and accompanying text. 
 147 See infra notes 193–200 and accompanying text. 
 148 See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105, 114–15 (2002) (holding con-
tinuing violation doctrine could not be used to extend timeliness of discrete discriminatory act claims, 
but only one act contributing to hostile work environment had to be within limitations period for hos-
tile work environment claim to be timely); Graham, supra note 58, at 302–04; Sperber & Welling, 
supra note 41, at 59 (asserting National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan allows employers to 
more forcefully oppose discrete act Title VII claims). 
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limitations period to be actionable.149 After Morgan, an employee can no long-
er rely on the continuing violation doctrine to extend the life of non-hostile 
work environment claims, which includes wrongful discharge or denial of 
transfer claims.150 
The Court’s reasoning in Morgan may explain why courts are more likely 
to find that a constructive discharge claim accrues at the date of resignation in 
a hostile work environment case than in a discrete act case.151 The pervasive 
nature of a hostile work environment claim allows earlier, otherwise time-
barred, actions to get pulled into the actionable period through the continuing 
violation doctrine.152 If the court determines that a hostile work environment 
exists, it presumably exists until the employee resigns and claims constructive 
discharge.153 In contrast, if an employee’s resignation is due to an employer’s 
discrete act, but the constructive discharge is the only actionable claim within 
the limitations period, constructive discharge itself must be a distinct adverse 
employment action in order for the claim to survive.154 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s 1987 decision in 
Young v. National Center for Health Services Research held that constructive 
discharge is “a distinct discriminatory ‘act’ for which there is a distinct cause 
of action.”155 Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 
2000 decision in Flaherty v. Metromail Corp. held that a constructive dis-
charge date accrues on the date the employee gives definite notice of her inten-
tion to resign or retire.156 The courts in Flaherty and Young analyzed construc-
tive discharge in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in 
Delaware State College v. Ricks, which held that the employer’s last discrimi-
                                                                                                                           
 149 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114–15 (distinguishing discrete acts of discrimination from hostile 
work environment). 
 150 See id. (identifying termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire as 
discrete acts that must actually occur within limitations period to be actionable). 
 151 See id. at 115–17; Graham, supra note 58, at 302 (“The Morgan majority observed that the 
‘entire hostile work environment encompasses a single unlawful employment practice’ because the 
‘very nature’ of a hostile work environment ‘involves repeated conduct.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115, 117)). 
 152 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115 (noting that hostile work environment arises from the accumula-
tion of discriminatory acts and does not occur on a specific date). 
 153 Graham, supra note 58, at 302 (discussing the holding in Morgan that only one incident of the 
hostile work environment must occur within the limitations period for the claim to be timely because 
hostile work environment embodies one unlawful practice). 
 154 See id. at 304 (“[A]ll nine justices agreed that the plain language of Title VII forbade the ag-
gregation of discrete discriminatory practices directed at a single plaintiff.” (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. 
at 113)); Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 11, Green v. Donahoe , 760 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 
2014) (No. 14-613), 2015 WL 1250866, at *11 (contending plaintiff’s argument applying Morgan to 
constructive discharge would require courts to treat employee’s resignation as a “discriminatory act”). 
 155 See Young v. Nat’l Ctr. for Health Servs. Research, 828 F.2d 235, 237–38 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 156 See Flaherty v. Metromail Corp., 235 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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natory act was its definite notice of termination, not one year later when the 
termination was realized.157 
The Flaherty and Young decisions emphasized that a constructive dis-
charge is distinguishable from a wrongful termination that was an inevitable 
consequence of a prior discriminatory act, such as the denial of tenure in 
Ricks.158 The court in Flaherty compared the employee’s definite notice of res-
ignation to an employer’s definite notice of discharge, which was treated as the 
date of accrual for the limitations period in Ricks.159 Unlike in Ricks where the 
employer gave notice of discharge, in constructive discharge cases the employ-
ee gives notice to the employer that the employment relationship is terminat-
ed.160 The court in Flaherty reasoned that only the employee knows when 
working conditions become “so intolerable” due to the employer’s discrimina-
tory actions that he or she must resign.161 The court concluded that the rule for 
all constructive discharge cases should be that the claims accrue on the date 
that employees give definite notice of their intention to resign.162 Additionally, 
the court rejected the notion that the employer’s discriminatory act prior to the 
employee’s notice to retire triggered the limitations period in a constructive 
discharge case.163 
Furthermore, resignation is an essential element of a constructive dis-
charge claim.164 Therefore, employees cannot successfully allege constructive 
discharge unless they actually resign or retire.165 By measuring timeliness from 
the employer’s last discriminatory act, instead of the actual date of resignation, 
it is possible for the constructive discharge claim’s limitations period to run 
                                                                                                                           
 157 See Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258–59 (1980); Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 137 
(citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258); Young, 828 F.2d at 237–38 (citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258). 
 158 See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258–59; Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 137; Young, 828 F.2d at 237–38. 
 159 See Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 137–38 (holding constructive discharge claims accrue on date em-
ployee gives definite notice of intention to retire or resign). 
 160 See id. (noting employee must take independent action for constructive discharge to occur). 
 161 See id. (discussing substantive constructive discharge law requirement that an “employer dis-
criminates against an employee and purposely makes the employee’s job conditions so intolerable that 
a reasonable person would feel forced to resign”). 
 162 See id. (comparing employee’s definite notice of resignation to employer’s definite notice of 
termination). 
 163 See id. 
 164 See Ekstrand v. School Dist. of Somerset, 583 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding employ-
ee was not constructively discharged because employment relationship continued while she was on 
leave); Cathy Shuck, That’s It, I Quit: Returning to First Principles in Constructive Discharge Doc-
trine, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 401, 402–03 & n.6 (2002) (discussing legal standard for deter-
mining constructive discharge); THOMPSON REUTERS, EMP’T DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR, 
§ 50:49 (2015) (outlining elements of plaintiff’s prima facie constructive discharge claim, which in-
cludes resignation).  
 165 See Conrad v. Chaco Credit Union, Inc., 946 F.2d 894, 1991 WL 216463, at *9 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(unpublished decision) (noting constructive discharge case law implicitly requires employee to resign 
or retire). 
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before there is even a constructive discharge claim.166 This result is contrary to 
the basic legal rule that a “limitations period commences when the plaintiff has 
a complete and present cause of action.”167 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s 2014 decision in Green 
v. Donahoe rejected this approach and held that constructive discharge is a “le-
gal fiction” and therefore cannot be treated as an adverse employment action 
by the employer.168 The Tenth Circuit evaluated the last alleged act of discrim-
ination committed by the employer and concluded the constructive discharge 
claim was time-barred.169 Although the Tenth Circuit’s statement that the con-
cept of constructive discharge is a “legal fiction” is accurate, it potentially dis-
regards the fact that courts developed this fiction to serve both remedial and 
substantive purposes.170 Courts developed the constructive discharge doctrine 
to allow employees to assert legal rights and defenses that would otherwise be 
unavailable in a situation where the employee simply resigned.171 
For instance, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Green concluded that the lim-
itations period for the plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim ran forty-five 
days after the employer’s last discriminatory action, which was the December 
16, 2009 settlement agreement, even though the plaintiff did not retire until 
February 9, 2010.172 The court in Green recommended that plaintiffs navigate 
this apparent incongruity by filing a charge based on the employer’s most re-
cent discriminatory act and then later amending the charge to include an alle-
gation of constructive discharge.173 In his petition for a writ of certiorari, Green 
contends that the Tenth Circuit approach runs counter to basic principles of 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 21–22. 
 167 See id. at 21 (quoting Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. 
Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 418 (2005)). 
 168 See Green v. Donahoe (Green II), 760 F.3d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub 
nom. Green v. Brennan, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (Apr. 27, 2015) (rejecting “legal fiction” that an employee’s 
resignation is a discriminatory act by the employer to satisfy requirement under 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1614.105(a)(1) that federal employees “initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date 
of the matter alleged to be discriminatory”). 
 169 See id. at 1145. 
 170 See id. at 1144; Chamallas, supra note 36, at 317 (noting that without constructive discharge, 
employees who resigned due to hostile work environment would not be able to recover for their eco-
nomic losses). 
 171 See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004) (noting how courts treat resignation 
by employee as a discharge by employer for constructive discharge claims); Chamallas, supra note 36, 
at 317 (“[T]he current law of constructive discharge has both a substantive and a remedial dimen-
sion.”); Shuck, supra note 164, at 403 (discussing importance of constructive discharge doctrine for 
federal employees who complain of discrimination because it permits remedies, including back pay, 
that would otherwise be unavailable to employees who quit). 
 172 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1138, 1145. 
 173 See id. at 1145. 
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fairness because an employee loses his chance to bring a claim for constructive 
discharge before the claim could be successfully pleaded.174 
B. Administrative Efficiency Hindered by Differing Approaches 
Federal anti-discrimination statutes require an enormous administrative ap-
paratus to investigate charges of discrimination and enforce the law.175 In 2014, 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) received over 
63,000 charges filed under Title VII.176 Federal regulations require employees 
who complain of discrimination to first file their charges with an EEOC counse-
lor.177 An incredibly small percentage of these charges are fully investigated by 
the EEOC and litigated by the Office of General Counsel.178 In 2014, the EEOC 
brought 167 enforcement suits under federal anti-discrimination laws, seventy-
six of which included Title VII claims.179 
The EEOC will frequently develop its own enforcement guidelines for 
federal anti-discrimination laws that may conflict with some federal courts’ 
interpretation of the same laws.180 Although the EEOC has not produced en-
forcement guidance on how to measure the limitations period for constructive 
discharge claims, there are indications that the EEOC would support the accru-
al from date-of-resignation rule.181 The EEOC filed an amicus brief in support 
of the employee in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s 2002 deci-
sion in Bailey v. United Airlines, which held that the employee’s wrongful dis-
charge claim began to run when he had unconditional notice of his termina-
                                                                                                                           
 174 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 21–22. 
 175 See Enforcement, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
enforcement/index.cfm [http://perma.cc/JY9R-VWEU]. 
 176 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges (Includes Concurrent Charges with 
ADEA, ADA and EPA) FY 1997–FY 2014, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.
eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm [http://perma.cc/4S3F-DCPL] [hereinafter Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges]. 
 177 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (2014) (outlining filing procedures for non-federal sector employees); 
id. § 1614.105 (providing pre-complaint processing procedures for federal sector employees). 
 178 See EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2014, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm [http://perma.cc/4HAT-
HVRF] [hereinafter EEOC Litigation Statistics]; Litigation, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, http:// www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/index.cfm [http://perma.cc/J6KU-XZPU]. 
 179 See EEOC Litigation Statistics, supra note 178. 
 180 Nancy M. Modesitt, The Hundred-Years War: The Ongoing Battle Between Courts and Agen-
cies Over the Right to Interpret Federal Law, 74 MO. L. REV. 949, 979–81 (2009) (discussing the 
EEOC’s nonacquiescence policy with regard to federal court decisions); Theodore W. Wern, Note, 
Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a 
Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533, 1578–80 (1999) (analyzing why the EEOC receives 
less judicial deference than other administrative agencies). 
 181 See Bailey v. United Airlines, 279 F.3d 194, 202 (3d Cir. 2002); Brief of the EEOC as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of the Appellant at 1, Bailey, 279 F.3d 194 (No. 00-2537), 2001 WL 34105245, at 
*1. 
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tion.182 The Third Circuit concluded there was a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding when the employee was notified of the adverse employment ac-
tion—the offer to resign or be terminated.183 The Third Circuit did not evaluate 
the EEOC’s amicus brief argument because the plaintiff did not raise this ar-
gument to the lower court and therefore it was waived on appeal.184 
In its amicus brief in Bailey, the EEOC argued that the limitations period 
for the employee’s wrongful discharge claim should not begin to run until the 
employee responded to his employer’s offer to resign or be terminated.185 The 
EEOC argued that the wrongful discharge claim’s limitations period should 
begin to run only after the employee told his employer he would not resign.186 
The EEOC’s amicus brief favorably cited Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc.—a 
1998 Ninth Circuit case—and Young to argue that the wrongful discharge’s 
limitations period should be the same as a constructive discharge’s limitations 
period, which the courts in Draper and Young held begins to run when the em-
ployee communicates their intention to resign.187 
The EEOC’s amicus brief in Bailey was filed before the D.C. Circuit’s 
2007 decision in Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & Safety Fund of North America 
and the Tenth Circuit’s 2014 decision in Green deepened the circuit split re-
garding the accrual of constructive discharge claims.188 It is possible the cur-
rent circuit split would alter the EEOC’s analysis.189 Nevertheless, the EEOC 
has relied on date-of-resignation claim accrual in its adjudication capacity.190 In 
                                                                                                                           
 182 See Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, supra note 181, at 8–10 
(arguing that charge-filing period for employee’s claim of unlawful termination did not begin to run 
until employee made decision rejecting offer to resign as alternative to termination). 
 183 See Bailey, 279 F.3d at 202. 
 184 See id. 
 185 See Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, supra note 181, at 8–10 
(noting that constructive discharge has difference legal consequences than an actual discharge because 
the employee has to decide when to resign (citing Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 139)). 
 186 See id. (rejecting contention that claim begins to run when discriminatory offer is made). 
 187 See Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 1998); Young, 828 
F.2d at 239; Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, supra note 181, at 8–
10. 
 188 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1135, 1143–45; Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & Safety Fund of N. 
Am., 478 F.3d 364, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of the 
Appellant, supra note 181, at 1–2 (arguing claim accrual begins when employee decides to accept or 
reject discriminatory retirement offer, which results in either constructive discharge or wrongful ter-
mination, respectively).  
 189 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1143–45; Mayers, 478 F.3d at 370; Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138; 
Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11; Davidson v. Ind.-Am. Water Works, 953 F.2d 1058, 1059–60 (7th Cir. 
1992); Young, 828 F.2d at 239; Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant, 
supra note 181, at 8–10 (no discussion of uncertainty in law regarding constructive discharge claim 
accrual). 
 190 See Shinseki, EEOC 0120141607, 2014 WL 3697473, at *2 (July 18, 2014); Gard, EEOC 
05890730, 1989 WL 1007278, at *1 (Sept. 8, 1989) (“the appropriate date on which the time period 
began to run was the effective date of the alleged discriminatory personnel action (retirement)”). In 
Gard, the plaintiff alleged that the Postal Service made a discriminatory offer, on the basis of his age, 
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a 2014 administrative appeal, Shinseki’s Case, the EEOC reversed the dismissal 
of a public-sector employee’s constructive discharge/ hostile work environment 
claim by holding that the employee’s date of resignation was within the forty-
five-day limitations period.191 It is worth noting, however, that this administra-
tive appeal concerned a constructive discharge resulting from a hostile work 
environment claim, and is thus distinguishable from Green, which concerns a 
constructive discharge due to a discrete discriminatory act.192 
C. Geographical Differences Creating Potentially Dispositive Unequal Results 
Although most circuit splits generally involve litigants from different 
parts of the country facing different interpretations of the law, this particular 
split has unequal results that are potentially claim dispositive.193 In his petition 
for a writ of certiorari in Green v. Donahue, Green decried the existing circuit 
split for allowing “geographical happenstance” to dictate whether a plaintiff’s 
Title VII constructive discharge claim survives in court long enough to be ad-
judicated on its merits.194 As a result of the circuit split, two constructive dis-
charge cases with identical facts could have completely unequal results—one 
case would survive summary judgment to be evaluated on its merits and the 
other case would be dismissed.195 
For example, Green worked as a postmaster in Colorado, and therefore his 
case was appealed to the Tenth Circuit.196 Green’s constructive discharge claim 
was dismissed before it could be adjudicated on its merits because the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that his claim was time-barred.197 If Green had worked as a postmaster 
                                                                                                                           
that he either resign or be removed from his position. See Gard, 1989 WL 1007278, at *1. On admin-
istrative appeal, the EEOC reversed the decision that the plaintiff’s claim was untimely because his 
retirement date was within the actionable period. See id. 
 191 See Shinseki, 2014 WL 3697473, at *1–2 (finding only one incident must occur within limita-
tions period to be actionable because hostile work environment claim constitutes one unlawful em-
ployment practice). 
 192 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1136–39; Shinseki, 2014 WL 3697473, at *1–2. 
 193 See Brief Amicus Curiae for the National Employment Lawyers Ass’n in Support of Petition-
er, supra note 143, at 1–2 (distinguishing circuit split at issue in Green II from other current circuit 
splits involving substantive elements of constructive discharge, including conflict over whether em-
ployer must intend for employee to resign); Macfarlane, supra note 41, at 252 (criticizing courts’ 
inordinate emphasis on determining whether plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies instead 
of evaluating the merits of Title VII claims). 
 194 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 18. 
 195 See id.; Ilori v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 742 F. Supp. 2d 734, 751–53 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (finding 
constructive discharge claim timely based on Second Circuit’s reasoning in Flaherty as Third Circuit 
has not yet addressed when constructive discharge claims accrue); Macfarlane, supra note 41, at 242, 
252 (discussing a different circuit split regarding whether presentment is jurisdictional that leads to 
some cases not being heard on the merits). 
 196 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1136. 
 197 See id. at 1135–36 (finding claim time-barred and not addressing whether plaintiff actually 
suffered constructively discharged). 
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in neighboring Arizona, his constructive discharge claim would have been timely 
based on the Ninth Circuit’s 1998 decision in Draper.198 The circuit courts’ dif-
fering approaches to how limitation periods accrue creates a stark contrast.199 
Based on geographical happenstance, some Title VII litigants are able to have 
the merits of their constructive discharge claims heard in court while others have 
claims that are time-barred.200 
III. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE IS A DISCRIMINATORY ACT: RESOLVING 
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT BY OVERTURNING GREEN V. DONAHOE 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to Green v. Donahoe, a 2014 
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which held that an 
employee’s claim for constructive discharge began to accrue at the date of the 
employer’s last discriminatory act, not the date of the employee’s resigna-
tion.201 The Court should resolve the circuit split by overturning Green and 
ruling that an employee’s constructive discharge claim begins to accrue when 
the employee gives definite notice of resignation.202 
Section A of this Part asserts that allowing a constructive discharge to be 
treated as a distinct discriminatory act is more consistent with the remedial and 
substantive purposes of Title VII.203 Section B of this Part argues that date-of-
resignation accrual is more efficient to administer.204 Section C of this Part 
argues that constructive discharge claim accrual based on date of resignation is 
more equitable for employees and better serves the objective of Title VII.205 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See id. at 1144; Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11 (holding that employee’s constructive discharge 
claim was timely based on date of resignation). 
 199 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1144; Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11. 
 200 Compare Green, 760 F.3d at 1136–37, 1144 (claim time-barred based on employer’s last dis-
criminatory act), Mayers, 478 F.3d at 370 (same), and Davidson, 953 F.2d at 1059–60 (same), with 
Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138 (claim timely based on date of resignation), Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11 
(same), Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285 (same), and Young, 828 F.2d at 239 (same). 
 201 See Green v. Donahoe (Green II), 760 F.3d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub 
nom. Green v. Brennan, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (Apr. 27, 2015). 
 202 Compare Green II, 760 F.3d at 1143–45 (holding claim began to accrue before date of resig-
nation), Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & Safety Fund of N. Am., 478 F.3d 364, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(same), and Davidson v. Ind.-Am. Water Works, 953 F.2d 1058, 1059–60 (7th Cir. 1992) (same), with 
Flaherty v. Metromail Corp., 235 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding constructive discharge claim 
began to accrue on date of resignation notice), Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1111 
(9th Cir. 1998) (same), Am. Airlines v. Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d 111, 123 (1st Cir. 1998) (same), 
Hukkanen v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Hoisting & Portable Local No. 101, 3 F.3d 281, 285 
(8th Cir. 1993) (same), and Young v. Nat’l Ctr. for Health Servs. Research, 828 F.2d 235, 239 (4th 
Cir. 1987) (same). 
 203 See infra notes 205–219 and accompanying text. 
 204 See infra notes 220–237 and accompanying text. 
 205 See infra notes 238–248 and accompanying text. 
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A. Treating Constructive Discharge as a Distinct Discriminatory Act Is 
More Consistent with the Remedial and Substantive Purposes of 
Constructive Discharge 
As actual resignation is an essential element of constructive discharge, the 
claim should not begin to accrue until the employee resigns.206 This date-of-
resignation approach to constructive discharge embodies the general legal rule 
that a litigant’s claim begins to accrue only once they have an enforceable legal 
right.207 Treating constructive discharge as a distinct employment act acknowl-
edges the reality that the claim exists only after the employee decides to resign 
due to intolerable working conditions.208 
Furthermore, the abrogation of the continuing violation doctrine for dis-
crete discriminatory acts means many constructive discharge claims are likely 
to be time-barred if the actual resignation is not treated as a distinct act.209 
Constructive discharge developed as a concept to allow employees to assert 
remedial and substantive rights that would otherwise be barred to them due to 
their resignation.210 As the abrogation of the continuing violation doctrine lim-
ited the timeliness of many discrete act claims, a date-of-resignation rule for 
constructive discharge would maintain at least some remedial and substantive 
Title VII protections for employees.211 
Additionally, the existing requirement of “intolerable working conditions” 
for constructive discharge claims should alleviate the concerns raised in the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Green, which held that the employee’s constructive 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See Ekstrand v. School Dist. of Somerset, 583 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding employ-
ee on leave was not constructively discharged because she had not resigned); Conrad v. Chaco Credit 
Union, Inc., 946 F.2d 894, 1991 WL 216463, at *9 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished decision) (discussing 
constructive discharge’s implicit requirement that employee be separated from employment through 
resignation or retirement); Shuck, supra note 164, at 403; THOMPSON REUTERS, supra note 164, at 
§ 50:49 (explaining requirements for plaintiff’s prima facie case to prove constructive discharge). 
 207 See Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 418 
(“We have repeatedly recognized that Congress legislates against the ‘standard rule that the limita-
tions period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.’” (quoting Bay 
Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997))). 
 208 See Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138 (noting that only the employee knows when conditions have 
become so intolerable that they must resign). 
 209 See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114–15 (2002) (abrogating the con-
tinuing violation doctrine for discrete acts of discrimination); Sperber & Welling, supra note 41, at 59 
(discussing how National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan made it easier for employers to defend 
against discrete discriminatory act claims). 
 210 Chamallas, supra note 36, at 317 (outlining both the substantive dimension of constructive 
discharge, described as working conditions being so intolerable that the employee’s quitting was justi-
fied, and the remedial dimension of constructive discharge, which provides that plaintiffs can recover 
damages for losing their jobs even though they quit). 
 211 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114–15 (abrogating the continuing violation doctrine for discrete acts 
of discrimination); Chamallas, supra note 36, at 317 (discussing substantive and remedial elements of 
constructive discharge). 
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discharge claim begins to accrue at the time of the employer’s last alleged dis-
criminatory act.212 The court in Green expressed concern that following the 
approach adopted by the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits would deny de-
fendants the protections of a statute of repose by allowing plaintiffs to inde-
pendently extend the life of their claims.213 The Tenth Circuit feared that 
measuring the limitations period from when the employee resigns gives the 
employee unilateral control over when the claim’s limitations period runs.214 
The Tenth Circuit felt this unilateral control by one party was contrary to the 
general principles of limitations periods.215 
The “intolerable working conditions” requirement imposed on construc-
tive discharge claims, however, is sufficient to prevent employees from delay-
ing the resignation for an unreasonable amount of time.216 In order to have a 
viable claim for constructive discharge, a reasonable person in that employee’s 
position must feel the conditions were so intolerable that they were forced to 
resign.217 For instance, if an employee alleges she was denied a promotion 
based on her race, but waits a year to resign, she will have destroyed her con-
structive discharge argument that a reasonable person would felt forced to re-
sign due to intolerable working conditions.218 Thus, an employee’s resignation 
must be within a reasonable time period of the employer’s last discriminatory 
action to constitute a constructive discharge, and the constructive discharge 
must be within the limitations period to be actionable.219 Therefore, the Tenth 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1144–45. 
 213 See id. (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)); Brief for Petitioner at 18–19, 
Green v. Brennan, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (July 6, 2015) (No. 14-613) (criticizing Tenth Circuit opinion for 
conflating statute of limitations, which partially exist to encourage plaintiffs to seek timely relief, with 
statutes of repose, which exist solely to protect defendants and cannot be equitably tolled). 
 214 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1144–45 (expressing concern employees could indefinitely delay 
filing constructive discharge claims under date-of-resignation rule by not resigning). 
 215 See id. (arguing date-of-resignation approach would offend an “essential feature of limitations 
periods” by allowing party seeking relief to indefinitely extend date of claim accrual). 
 216 See Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11 & n.2 (reasoning plaintiffs would undermine substantive 
constructive discharge claim by unreasonably delaying their resignation). 
 217 See id. 
 218 See id. (noting that the “frequency and freshness” of the harassment may enter into fact-
finder’s determination of whether resignation was a constructive discharge). 
 219 See id. The court in Draper noted: 
Draper retains the burden of proving that her termination was a constructive dis-
charge—that, in the view of a reasonable person, her conditions of employment had be-
come intolerable. The frequency and freshness of the instances of harassment may enter 
into that determination. If the trier of fact finds, however, that under all of the circum-
stances the termination was a constructive discharge, then the discharge becomes the 
actionable event for purposes of the 300-day limitation. Our decision determines only 
when the claim arose, not whether its merits have been established; in reviewing the 
district court’s summary judgment that the claim was time-barred, we necessarily as-
sume that Draper can prove a constructive discharge. 
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Circuit’s concern that an employee would keep working under such intolerable 
circumstances simply to extend his charge-filing period seems unfounded, as it 
would undermine the merits of the employee’s constructive discharge claim.220 
B. Accrual from Date of Resignation Is Simpler to Administer 
The importance of administrative efficiency should motivate the Court to 
adopt date-of-resignation approach when resolving the circuit split.221 The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) processes tens of thousands of 
charges of illegal discrimination in violation of Title VII each year.222 This mas-
sive caseload makes administrative efficiency especially important in order for 
Title VII to be successfully enforced.223 The circuit split exacerbates the already 
heavy workload faced by the EEOC and hampers the efficient processing of em-
ployee’s charges.224 The date-of-resignation rule provides the EEOC with a clear 
approach to determine whether a constructive discharge claim is timely.225 Under 
this rule, less agency resources will be wasted on determining what constituted 
the employer’s last discriminatory act and whether the plaintiff’s claim is subse-
                                                                                                                           
See id. at 1110 n.2. Under this approach, an employee’s resignation would trigger the limitations peri-
od during which the employee must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”). See id. Therefore, a federal employee would still only have forty-five days from his or her 
date of resignation to initiate contact with an EEO counselor. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 (2014) (noting 
that federal sector employees “must initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the 
matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the effective 
date of the action”). 
 220 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1144–45; Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110 & n.2; Macfarlane, supra note 
41, at 218, 252 (criticizing courts for “aggressively eliminating” Title VII cases based on administra-
tive exhaustion jurisdictional grounds instead of developing Title VII substantive law by allowing 
more cases to be discussed on their merits). 
 221 See EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. 107, 124 (1988) (holding threed-hundred-
day federal filing window still applies even if claim untimely under state law to avoid EEOC having 
to undertake burdensome case-by-case analysis of state law.) 
 222 See EEOC Litigation Statistics, supra note 178 (seventy-six EEOC enforcement lawsuits with 
Title VII claims filed in 2014); Litigation, supra note 178 (noting the Office of General Counsel con-
ducts litigation on behalf of the EEOC). 
 223 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 22–24 (discussing the importance of ad-
ministrative efficiency in a layperson-initiated process where thousands of cases are filed annually). 
 224 See id.; see also Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. at 118 n.4, 124 (emphasizing importance 
of efficiency in legislature’s decision to adopt state deferral compromise); Macfarlane, supra note 41, 
at 216, 229 (criticizing the ineffective EEOC for essentially being an “administrative waiting room” 
for Title VII claimants). 
 225 See Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138 (claim timely based on employee’s retirement); Draper, 147 
F.3d at 1110–11 (claim timely based on employee’s resignation); Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d at 123 
(claim time-barred based on employee’s election to retire); Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285 (claim timely 
based on employee’s resignation); Young, 828 F.2d at 239 (claim timely based on employee’s resigna-
tion). 
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quently time-barred.226 The EEOC would be able to make more accurate and 
efficient decisions about whether a constructive discharge claim is time-barred, 
and thus, more quickly decide whether to file an enforcement suit or issue a 
right-to-sue letter to the employee.227 
In comparing the two approaches on either side of the circuit split, it is 
apparent that the employee’s date of resignation is much easier to determine 
than the employer’s last act of discrimination giving rise to the alleged con-
structive discharge.228 The date of an employee’s resignation is generally easy 
to identify, while an employer’s last discriminatory act may require the court’s 
analysis of substantive law and fact-specific inquiry.229 To determine whether a 
constructive discharge claim is timely, for instance, the court would have to 
use substantive constructive discharge law to examine which of the employer’s 
most recent discriminatory actions would make a reasonable employee feel 
forced to quit.230 In contrast, the date-of-resignation rule simplifies the initial 
timeliness inquiry and leaves more complicated analysis of substantive law to 
the merits stage of litigation.231 
Furthermore, the EEOC lacks the resources to enforce Title VII due to the 
massive amount of charges they receive each year, so it is often up to private 
litigants to enforce their rights.232 As private litigants often have to pursue their 
own claims in place of the EEOC, the simpler date-of-resignation rule would 
also benefit Title VII enforcement.233 By ruling that constructive discharge is 
an alleged unlawful employment practice for the purposes of the limitations 
                                                                                                                           
 226 See Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 265–66 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing cause of action for discriminatory discharge should accrue on date of discharge because that 
date can “normally be identified with the least difficulty or dispute”). 
 227 See Macfarlane, supra note 41, at 238, 252 (noting that the EEOC’s lack of resources largely 
leaves Title VII enforcement to private litigants). 
 228 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 23–24. 
 229 See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 265–66 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing date of discharge is most sen-
sible rule partly because it is easier to identify than date of employer’s decision to terminate or notice 
of termination); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 213, at 12–13 (discussing substantive law standards 
for constructive discharge, hostile work environment, and retaliation that may bear on determining 
employer’s last discriminatory act). 
 230 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 213, at 12–13 (arguing “last-discriminatory-act rule would 
force courts to determine which ‘acts’ are sufficiently ‘discriminatory’ to trigger the limitations peri-
od”). 
 231 See id. at 30–32 (arguing date-of-resignation rule would avoid complex fact-specific analysis 
of what constitutes a sufficient discriminatory act when determining timeliness of claim). 
 232 See Macfarlane, supra note 41, at 238, 252 (arguing that because the EEOC lacks the re-
sources to enforce Title VII, litigants should have more flexibility in amending and investigating their 
claims in federal court); EEOC Litigation Statistics, supra note 178 (seventy-six EEOC enforcement 
suits filed with Title VII claims in 2014); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges, supra note 
176 (noting that 63,589 Title VII charges were received in 2014). 
 233 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 22–24 (noting that accommodating laypeo-
ple is a core goal of Title VII instructions); Macfarlane, supra note 41, at 238 (discussing how private 
litigants must “stand in the shoes of the EEOC” due to lack of EEOC resources). 
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period, the U.S. Supreme Court would instead adopt the approach that is easier 
for the EEOC to administer, both through its own enforcement actions and vi-
cariously through employee’s private lawsuits.234 
The current circuit split also hampers efficiency by creating potentially 
outcome determinative results based on geographical differences.235 As there 
are several circuits that have yet to address when a constructive discharge 
claim accrues, many employers and employees cannot anticipate whether 
courts would find a constructive discharge claim timely.236 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has previously stated that uncertainty regarding statute of limitations 
negatively impacts both sides because plaintiffs risk unwittingly forfeiting 
claims and defendants cannot accurately calculate their potential liabilities.237 
Similarly, employers might arguably be better off with the date-of-resignation 
rule, even though it would extend some employees’ claims, because it is much 
more clear-cut and allows each side to evaluate the viability of the claim with-
out costly litigation over timeliness.238 
C. The Majority Approach Is More Equitable for Employees and Better 
Serves the Objective of Title VII 
By ruling that constructive discharge claims accrue on the date of resigna-
tion, the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt a clear and intuitive rule that would 
be easier for employees to follow.239 Over several decades of litigation, Title 
VII law has become increasingly complex.240 The administrative exhaustion 
requirement of Title VII, however, still necessitates that the law be clear 
enough so that employees can invoke their rights by filing charges with the 
EEOC within the proper timeframe.241 It is counterintuitive that an employee’s 
                                                                                                                           
 234 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 23–24. 
 235 See id. at 18 (noting identical action by employer leads to different outcomes based simply on 
geographic location). 
 236 See Ilori v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 742 F. Supp. 2d 734, 751–53 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (noting 
Third Circuit has yet to address when constructive discharge claims accrue); Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiorari, supra note 1, at 18 (arguing uncertainty places burden on national corporations that have to 
predict which rule will apply in circuits that have yet to address this issue). 
 237 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S 261, 275 & n.34 (1985) (holding more simple approach to 
statute of limitations is “consistent with the assumption that Congress intended the identification of 
the appropriate statute of limitations to be an uncomplicated task for judges, lawyers, and litigants, 
rather than a source of uncertainty, and unproductive and ever-increasing litigation”). 
 238 See id. (arguing defendants also benefit from clear limitations periods in order to calculate 
liabilities). 
 239 See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 265–66 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that discriminatory discharge 
claim should accrue on date of discharge because it is the date that can “normally be identified with 
the least difficulty or dispute”). 
 240 Chamallas, supra note 36, at 309 (arguing Title VII law has never been more complex and is 
“transform[ing] into a highly technical field where nonspecialists fear to tread”). 
 241 See Chamallas, supra note 36, at 309 (noting how many commentators have called for simpli-
fication of Title VII law because employees should be able to understand the law that protects their 
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constructive discharge claim could be time-barred before the employee has 
even resigned.242 Although it seems reasonable that a layperson employee would 
realize she has a constructive discharge claim only after she actually resigns, 
under the Tenth Circuit’s approach, her constructive discharge claim could al-
ready be time-barred.243 To avoid this anomaly, the Court should follow the 
First, Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits’ decisions and adopt the date-
of-resignation rule as it is the most intuitive for layperson employees.244 
This more straightforward approach to measuring constructive discharge 
claim accrual also prevents more sophisticated employers from abusing a less-
intuitive limitations period rule.245 The approach advocated by the Tenth, Sev-
enth, and District of Columbia Circuits could lead to employers intentionally 
structuring settlement offers with a long enough consideration period in order 
to foreclose their employee’s potential constructive discharge claims.246 If an 
employee, such as Green, takes the entire consideration period the employer 
provides to decide between an offer of resignation or termination, by the time 
the employee makes his decision to resign, his constructive discharge claim 
could already be time-barred.247 Employees would presumably be unaware that 
their claim for constructive discharge began to run when the discriminatory 
settlement offer was made, not after they took time to think about the offer and 
                                                                                                                           
rights); Macfarlane, supra note 41, at 255–56 (arguing strict technical requirements should be relaxed 
to better allow private litigants to enforce their rights under Title VII). 
 242 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 21–24 (arguing employees would not ex-
pect their constructive discharge claims to expire before they resign). 
 243 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1145 (suggesting employees could likely file EEOC charge before 
resigning and then amend claim to add constructive discharge); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 231, at 
33–34 (criticizing Tenth Circuit’s suggestion that employees amend charge to add constructive dis-
charge because amending may not extend the filing deadline, is more confusing for laypeople em-
ployees, and does not apply to stand-alone constructive discharge claims). 
 244 See Flaherty, 235 F.3d at 138; Draper, 147 F.3d at 1110–11; Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 285; Young, 
828 F.2d at 239. 
 245 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 26 (arguing last-discriminatory-act rule 
incentivizes employers to structure discriminatory offers with long consideration periods to foreclose 
employees’ potential constructive discharge claims). 
 246 See id. 
 247 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1143–45; Mayers, 478 F.3d at 370; Davidson, 953 F.2d at 1059–60; 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 26. For instance, in Green, after the plaintiff reported 
the alleged discrimination to an EEOC counselor, the employer told Green that he could either retire 
or take a position at another branch three hundred miles away. See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1138. Green 
signed the settlement agreement on December 16, 2009, which stated that he had until the end of 
March to make his decision between retiring and transferring. See id. When Green submitted his res-
ignation on February 9, 2010, the limitations period on his constructive discharge claim had already 
run, according to the Tenth Circuit, because his resignation was more than forty-five days after the 
settlement agreement. See id. at 1138–39. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Postal 
Service structured the offer this way to foreclose Green’s potential constructive discharge case. See id. 
Furthermore, the current circuit split over when constructive discharge claims accrue made it especial-
ly unlikely that the Postal Service predicted this settlement would foreclose Green’s potential future 
constructive discharge claim. See id. at 1143–45. 
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decided to resign.248 Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court should overturn the 
decision in Green so that employers cannot trick employees to forgo their po-
tential constructive discharge claim by offering them a long enough time peri-
od for to mull a discriminatory settlement offer.249 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split regarding when an 
employee’s Title VII constructive discharge claims begins to accrue by overturn-
ing the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Green v. Donahoe. A majority of circuit courts 
that have addressed this issue have held that the employee’s claim accrues on the 
date when the employee gives definite notice of his intention to resign or retire. 
The U.S. Supreme Court should adopt this majority approach because it is more 
administratively efficient and intuitive for employees. Title VII is intended to 
empower laypeople employees to report and contest discrimination in the work-
place. The U.S. Supreme Court should adopt the rule that best serves the objec-
tives of Title VII by allowing employees to enforce their rights and combat 
workplace discrimination. 
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 248 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 26 (arguing date-of-last-discriminatory-act 
rule creates potential for abuse by employers). 
 249 See Green II, 760 F.3d at 1145–47; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 26 (com-
paring employers’ potential use of tactfully-structured discriminatory offers to employers’ objectiona-
ble strategies that originally led to the development of the constructive discharge doctrine). 
